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PHILADELPHIA LAWYER. A CAUTIONARY TALEt
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I propose to talk with you today about a lawyer of notable and diverse accomplishment. He was a leading courtroom lawyer-one of
the very best. During his early years at the bar he taught law-and in
the twilight of his career he served as dean-at one of the great law
schools. And in mid-career-at the peak of his lawyerly fame-he was
named to the bench. He was a Philadelphia lawyer. Indeed, he may
be perceived as the quintessential Philadelphia lawyer. And yet a
faithful account of that portion of his career which would seem to

t Owen J. Roberts Memorial Lecture, presented at the University of Pennsylvania
Law School on November 13, 1996.
- United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. I am
grateful to Stephen B. Burbank, Frank L. Goodman, Louise E. Hayes and Seth E.
Mermin for perceptive criticisms of the penultimate draft of this Lecture.
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have been crowned with greenest laurels-his years on the highest of
high courts-turns out to be a cautionary tale: a cautionary tale
which, I respectfully suggest, those who now sit on that highest court
would be well advised to take into account.
I.
As, doubtless, many of you have already surmised, the Philadelphia lawyer about whom I will speak is Owen Josephus Roberts, the
person honored by this Lectureship.
Roberts was born in Germantown in 1875. At the age of sixteen
he matriculated at the University of Pennsylvania, where he was to
spend four years as an undergraduate and three years studying law.
At the College-where he majored in Greek, writing his senior essay
on "The Agamemnon Myth as Treated by the Attic Dramatists"Roberts achieved high academic honors. He continued this pattern
at the Law School, where he was elected to the student editorial board
of the American Law Register, soon to become the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, and where he won the Sharswood essay prize. Roberts was so highly regarded by the law faculty that, after graduating
and commencing practice in 1898, he was appointed to a teaching fellowship at the Law School. This appointment marked the beginning
of an adjunct professorial role that spanned Roberts's early and middle years as a practicing lawyer. These were years in which, while
teaching property at Penn, Roberts was learning the trade of a litigator. In 1919, twenty-one years after graduating from the Law School,
Roberts found that the demands of his growing practice precluded
further teaching, and he resigned his adjunct professorship. But, as
we shall see, the time was to come when the Roberts-Penn connection
would be reestablished.
Throughout the 1920s Roberts prospered and gained national
recognition. In 1924, President Coolidge appointed Roberts one of
two Special Counsel to investigate-and, if feasible, bring about the
cancellation of-what appeared to be corrupt leases to private oil interests of large reserves of government oil stored for the Navy; the
suspect leases, entered into during the Harding administration, were
the transactions which, collectively, came to be known as "Teapot
Dome."' In 1930, President Hoover, with the advice and unanimous
I Roberts's fellow Special Counsel was Atlee Pomerene, a former senator from
Ohio. The investigation focused on 1) the lease of the Elk Hill Reserves in California
and the Pearl Harbor Naval Fuel Oil Storage Project, and 2) the lease of the Teapot
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consent of the Senate,
appointed Roberts an Associate Justice of the
2
Supreme Court.
The litigator-turnedjudge3 was to serve on the Court for fifteen
years-through the balance of Hoover's presidency and the entirety
of the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt. For the Court-and for the
country-they were years of challenge and change, of Depression and
war. In just a few moments I will undertake to remind you of certain
Dome oil reserves in Wyoming. The leases had been authorized by Albert Fall, President Harding's Secretary of the Interior. Fall was convicted of accepting a bribe. Litigation directed by Roberts and Pomerene resulted in cancellation of the leases. See
Robert T. McCracken, OrvenJ. Roberts-MasterAdvocate 104 U. PA. L. REV. 322, 326-29
(1955); see also Mammoth Oil Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 13 (1927).
2 Roberts was appointed to fill the vacancy created by the
death ofJustice Edward
Terry Sandford. Hoover had first nominated Judge John J. Parker of the Fourth Circuit, but Parker, whose nomination was opposed by the American Federation of Labor
and by the NAACP, failed of Senate confirmation by one vote. The senators who took
the lead in derailing the Parker nomination were William E. Borah and George W.
Norris. A freshman senator who followed the Borah-Norris lead was Hugo L. Black.
Black later observed of Parker-who remained on the Fourth Circuit, serving with
considerable distinction, for almost thirty years--"John Parker was a betterJudge after
the hearing than before it." ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 135
(1994).
3 In changing roles from lawyer to judge, Roberts,
a person of instinctive courtesy,
evidently maintained a strong empathy for the practicing lawyers who appeared before
him. Good evidence of this is found in Francis Biddle's account of his first argument
in the Supreme Court as Solicitor General in 1940. Biddle was scheduled to argue two
related cases. On the day before the argument he felt distinctly unwell, but he decided that he did not want to commence his service as Solicitor General by asking the
Court for a continuance:
I decided to take a chance, swallowed a Benzedrine pill early in the morning
of the argument, and turned up in Court a bit shaky.
The cases were to be argued separately as they involved different claims. As
we had lost both in the courts below, I opened for the United States. I got
through the first pretty well. But when the second was called, and I rose to
open, everything went black, and my memory became a blank filled only with
a sense of shame. I hesitated. Justice Owen Roberts, a Philadelphian whom I
had known well before he went on the bench and greatly liked, sensing the
situation, leaned forward. "Mr. Solicitor General," he said, "I have read the
briefs, but I am not sure that I have the facts accurately. Will you correct me if
I am wrong? It would appear that..." and he proceeded to state the facts in
his admirably lucid style. The blank vanished, the case came back, shame
evaporated, the law of the case was easy to present. Roberts did not have to
prompt me again, but the faint trace of a friendly smile was there, as if he
were saying "It's all right, Francis, it's all right. . ." Many years later I taxed
him with it. He said yes, you did look pretty white, and you kept mopping
your forehead. He didn't think the brethren had noticed particularly, though
he did not remember any very favorable comments on the first appearance of
the new Solicitor .... How could you help loving a man who did that sort of
thing for you?
FRANcIs BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 100 (1962).
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of the major themes that affected the Court. Suffice it to note here
that what began as the highest honor that could come to a member of
the bar was to become an increasingly difficult and unrewarding passage. In Roberts's last years on the Court he was the senior Associate
Justice-and a marginal figure. When he left the Court in 1945 his
colleagues could not even muster up the minimum collective courtesy
of sending the customary letter of appreciation and farewell.
Leaving the Court did not mean quitting public service. Quite
the contrary. Leaving the Court permitted Roberts to lend his name
and his energies to a variety of significant civic endeavors. But Roberts declined President Truman's request that he take on a further
judicial chore-serving as the United States member of the Court at
Nuremberg, the four-power tribunal that tried the German war
criminals. When Roberts said "no," Truman appointed Francis Biddle, another eminent Philadelphia lawyer.4
Fortunately, Roberts said "yes" when, in 1948, his alma mater
asked him to return to the Penn faculty after an absence of twentynine years. Roberts's academic reincarnation was full-time, as dean of
the Law School, to fill the post unexpectedly vacated by Earl Harrison.
Roberts was dean for three years. He worked hard and effectively to
increase faculty salaries, raise scholarship funds, and strengthen the
Biddle Law Library.5 But Dean Roberts's best and most enduring contribution to this School and this University-and, arguably, to the City
and the Commonwealth as well-was to persuade a young alumnus of
this Law School who had begun teaching law out in the heartland (at
the University of Iowa) to return to Penn as a member of the faculty:
Leo Levin. It should be acknowledged, however, that Roberts's deanship was marked by two protocols which have not turned out to be
lasting ingredients of his academic legacy. Thus-and this I state to
my certain knowledge-not all of Roberts's successors as dean have
insisted, as Roberts did, that the dean receive no salary. And not all
faculty members-nor, indeed, all deans-have seen the wisdom of
the Roberts principle of law school governance which, so it is reported, contemplated "that the relationship of the members of a law
4 Biddle and Roberts were good friends. Seesupra
note 3.

Appointed to serve as alternate United States member of the Nuremberg Court
was Judge John J. Parker of the Fourth Circuit. It had been Parker whom Hoover
originally nominated in 1930 to fill the Supreme Court vacancy occasioned by the
death of Justice Sandford; and, when Parker failed to receive Senate confirmation,
Hoover nominated Roberts. Seesupra note 2.
' See Edwin R. Keedy, OwenJ. Roberts and the Law Schoo4 104 U. PA. L. REV. 318, 320
(1955).
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faculty with each other is similar to that of the judges of an appellate
court, with the dean corresponding to the chiefjustice."6
In 1951, at the age of seventy-six, Roberts retired from the deanship. A year later he accepted the presidency of the American Philosophical Society; Roberts was the twenty-fourth president in a line that
stretches back to Jefferson and Franklin. In May of 1955, two weeks
after his eightieth birthday, Roberts died.
II.
"The last thing that Justice Roberts would want is that this Lectureship should be turned into a laudatory exercise. Nothing would
that exquisitely modest man deplore more."' So said Felix Frankfurter on March 20, 1957, when he delivered the first lecture in this
series which is now in its fortieth year. Frankfurter devoted his lecture to the question of whether Supreme CourtJustices need to have
prior judicial experience-a question he answered in the negative,
and fortunately so, given that neither Frankfurter nor Roberts had
been ajudge before becoming aJustice.9 But, true to his word, Frank6id7 The

December 1955 issue of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review was dedicated to Roberts. The lead essay was by Justice Frankfurter. See Felix Frankfurter, Mr.
Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (1955). The Justice's eloquent tribute to his late
colleague is discussed infra note 25. The one essay in the symposium that discussed
Roberts's contribution as ajustice was by Erwin N. Griswold, OwenJ. Roberts as ajudge
104 U. PA. L. REV. 332 (1955). Other essays canvassed Roberts's career as a lawyer, his
links with the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and his wide array of public activities. The final essay was a profile entitled Owenj Roberts-The Man, 104 U. PA. L.
REV. 372 (1955), by Roberts's Philadelphia colleague and mentor, George Wharton
Pepper. The architect of this memorial issue of the Law Review was Editor-in-Chief
Curtis Reitz.
Apart from the memorial issue of the Law Review there have been singularly few
published writings about Roberts. There is an informative essay by David Burner,
Owenj Roberts, in 3 THEJUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969, at
2253 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969). There is, however, no full-scale biography. The most penetrating examination of Roberts's role on the Court is provided by Richard D. Friedman in his remarkable article, Switching Time and Other
Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and ConstitutionalTransformation, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 1891, 1939-53 (1994).
8 Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Courtin the Mirror ofJustices, 105 U. PA.
L. REV. 781,
781 (1957).
9 Frankfurter noted that, as of the time he presented his lecture,
there had been
ninety Supreme CourtJustices. "[O]mitting contemporary and relatively recent occupants of the Court," id. at 782, Frankfurter reduced to seventy-five the number ofJustices to be ranked. Frankfurter listed twelve Justices-Marshall, William Johnson,
Story, Taney, Miller, Field, Bradley, Edward D. White "(despite his question-begging
verbosities)," Holmes, Hughes, Brandeis and Cardozo-as to whose distinction he
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furter did not use the occasion to pay extravagant tribute to his late
colleague and friend, let alone to undertake an assessment of Roberts's judicial work product. And the lecturers who have followed
Frankfurter have in the main been bound by his dictum that lauding
the honoree is not what this Lectureship is all about. Of course a few
of the lecturers have said gracious words about Roberts, but none has
sought to parse even a fraction of the 353 opinions-282 for the
Court-written by Roberts in his fifteen judicial years. 0
Today I will talk about some of Roberts's work as ajudge. But it is
not my purpose to examine Roberts's cases in detail. What I want to
do is briefly to recall a major chapter-indeed, a decisive chapter-in
our constitutional history which has now largely receded from view. It
is a chapter that was turmoil-filled, and in which Roberts played a central role. From the perspective of the Court as an institution, that difficult chapter had a reasonably happy ending; but it was not a happy
ending for Roberts. In undertaking to refresh your recollection of
these matters, I will point to certain aspects of Roberts's judicial balance sheet. But I will do so not for the purpose of reconstructing--or
deconstructing-Roberts. I will do so because I think a backward
glance may add perspective-for better or for worse-to an assessment of certain issues of substantial import confronting the Court tothought there was "a consensus of informed judgment." Id. at 783. Of the consensus
twelve, only five had served as judges before being appointed to the Court. (The five
were Johnson, Field, White, Holmes and Cardozo.) Frankfurter went on to explain
that in his view four otherJustices-Curtis, Campbell, Matthews and Moody-deserved
to be ranked with the twelve, making a total of "sixteen Justices whom I deem preeminent." Id. at 784. Of the additional four, only Matthews had had prior judicial experience. Thus, ten of Frankfurter's sixteen "preeminent" Justices were innocent ofjudging before coming to the Court.
If one were to attempt a partial updating of Frankfurter's rankings by including
the fifteen Justices he excluded (because they were, in 1957 when Frankfurter presented his lecture, "contemporary and relatively recent occupants of the Court") there
are at least four additional Justices as to whom, I trust, there can be said to be "a consensus of informed judgment" that they were "preeminent." Those four are Stone,
Black, Frankfurter and Brennan. Brennan had seven years of state judicial experience,
both trial and appellate, before coming to the Court; Black, at the age of twenty-five,
was appointed to the Birmingham Police Court-a part-time judicial post-and served
for a year-and-a-half; Stone had never been a judge; nor had Frankfurter, but Frankfurter came to the Court as the most knowledgeable student of the institution since
the First Congress, and then the Jay, Ellsworth and Marshall Courts, breathed life into
Article III. (There are four other mid-1950s Justices whom many-albeit perhaps not
a consensus-would dub "preeminent": Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas,
Jackson and Harlan. Of these only Harlan had been ajudge before becoming ajustice.)
10 For assessments of some aspects of Roberts's judicial work-product,
see the 1955
essay by Dean Griswold and the 1994 article by Professor Friedman, supra note 7.
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day, half a century after Roberts resigned his commission.
III.
When Roberts came to the Court in 1930, he was the second of
two Justices appointed by Hoover in the same year. Roberts's companion appointee was not a newcomer to the Court. He was Charles
Evans Hughes, returning as Chief Justice to the Court on which he
had served as an Associate Justice two decades before. Of the seven
Justices whom Hughes and Roberts joined, the two eldest-Holmes at
eighty-nine and Brandeis at seventy-four-were already the stuff of
legend. Proceeding from very different philosophic premisesHolmes was a sceptic and Brandeis a reformer-they had arrived at
very similar jurisprudential positions: From a constitutional perspective, they tended to be tolerant of governmental measures that imposed restraints on economic interactions, but intolerant of restraints
on the marketplace of ideas. Harlan Fiske Stone-a former dean of
the Columbia Law School and also a former Attorney General-was in
close accord with Holmes and Brandeis. When, in 1932, Holmes retired and was succeeded by another legendary figure, Benjamin Cardozo, the new Justice quickly aligned himself with Brandeis and
Stone. Arrayed against the three liberal Justices were the four profoundly conservative Justices known as the Four Horsemen-Willis
Van Devanter, James Clark McReynolds (who was also a bigot-when
Cardozo was appointed, McReynolds didn't take kindly to there being
yet anotherJew on the Court), George Sutherland and Pierce Butler.
The Four Horsemen tended to translate their laissez-faire principles
into constitutional imperatives, taking the most narrowly astringent
view of congressional power to regulate interstate commerce and to
tax and spend for the general welfare, and finding in the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause a strong bulwark against state laws
regulating local economic activity.
Given this division among their colleagues, Hughes and Roberts
could by their decisive votes shape the constitutional capacity of the
nation and the states to meet the Depression. At first they gave signs
of siding with the liberal Justices, Roberts making a particularly valuable contribution in Nebbia v. New York," which upheld a New York
statute regulating the price of milk. But midway through FDR's first
term the judicial tide began to turn against the New Deal.
In 1935 and 1936 the Court dealt the New Deal many hard blows.
" 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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I will focus on only a few. First I will refer to two cases in which the
Court struck down statutes bottomed on Congress's constitutional
power to "regulate Commerce... among the several States"-i.e., interstate commerce. The first statute, invalidated in RailroadRetirement
Board v. Alton Railroad Co.,12 was a congressional directive to the railroads to establish a pension system. Railroads had been the subject of
detailed congressional supervision for decades, but Roberts and the
Four Horsemen could see no merit in the notion that giving structure
to the retirement aspect of the employment relationship would promote the morale and hence the efficiency of railroad workers. The
opinion, written by Roberts, found the statute's purposes to be "really
and essentially related solely to •the• social
r.,, welfare of13the worker, and
therefore remote from any regulation of commerce.
Hughes filed a
dissenting opinion, which wasjoined by Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo.
The second statute, invalidated in Carterv. CarterCoal Co.,' 4 undertook
to regulate prices and conditions of labor in the bituminous coal
mines. In an opinion by Sutherland, joined by his three fellow
Horsemen and also by Roberts, conditions of labor in the mines were
held to be outside the regulatory authority of Congress, because mining coal, as distinct from marketing coal after it emerged from the
mines, was deemed to have only an "indirect" impact on interstate
commerce. Hughes concurred in part. Cardozo, joined by Brandeis
and Stone, dissented.
In addition to curtailing the commerce power, the Court placed

narrow limits on Congress's other principal power over the economy-the power to tax and spend. In United States v. Butler,5 in 1936,
Roberts, joined by Hughes and the Four Horsemen, overturned the
first Agricultural Adjustment Act, a statute creating financial inducements for farmers to reduce the production of crops that were in ruinous oversupply. Stone,joined by Brandeis and Cardozo, dissented.
Finally, in the Tipaldo case," also in 1936, in an opinion written by
Butler and joined by the three other Horsemen plus Roberts, the
Court invalidated a NewYork State statute setting minimum wages for
women. Hughes and Stone filed dissenting opinions which were
joined by Brandeis and Cardozo. Taken together, RailroadRetirement
Board, Carter Coal, Butler and Tipaldo raised serious questions about
2

295 U.S. 330 (1935).

13 Id. at

368.
298 U.S. 238 (1936).
15297 U.S. 1 (1936).
16Morehead v. New York ex rel.
Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
14
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whether either the United States or the individual states had governmental power sufficient to revive a stricken economy.
On Election Day 1936-just sixty years ago last week-Roosevelt
was reelected by the greatest Electoral College majority in the history
of the Republic. Three months later, in February of 1937, the President, smarting under the Supreme Court's repudiation of important
New Deal initiatives, proposed his gravely wrong-headed remedylegislation to authorize packing the Court through the appointment
of a new Justice, up to a ceiling of fifteen, for every Justice remaining
in service after reaching the age of seventy. One supposed rationale
for FDR's proposal was that the elderly Justices could not keep up
with their work-a transparently disingenuous proposition, since the
Court was up-to-date in disposing of the cases on its docket.
A month later, on March 29, 1937, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,'7 the Court, speaking through Hughes, sustained a Washington
State minimum-wage-for-women statute. The vote was five-to-four.
The difference in result from Tipaldo, decided only nine months before, was that Roberts had changed sides. The possibility that a new
constitutional jurisprudence was in the process of taking hold was
confirmed, less than a month later, when the Court, in a series of
opinions-two by Hughes"9 and two by Roberts'9-sustained the National Labor Relations Act. The key opinion was that of Hughes in
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,20 which explained why stabilizing
labor relations in one of the major steel companies was an objective
within the reach of the commerce power. It appeared that the Court
had at last adopted an expansive view of the Commerce Clause not
readily reconcilable with the minimalist view adhered to only a year
before in CarterCoaL

Later in the spring of 1937, the Court, in two companion cases,
upheld the unemployment compensation and old-age benefits portions of the Social Security Ace'-provisions that the narrow view of
the taxing and spending power announced in the Butler case a year
before had seemed to render constitutionally vulnerable. In both
cases, Cardozo wrote for the Court; in both cases, Roberts and
17 300 U.S.
18

379 (1937).

See NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937); NLRB v.

Jones &Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
1 See Washington, Va. & Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142
(1937); Associated
Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
20

301 U.S. 1 (1937).

' See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301

U.S. 548 (1937).
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Hughes were part of the majority.2 In June, the senior member of
the Four Horsemen, Van Devanter, retired. In the same month the
Senate Judiciary Committee rendered a negative report on the Courtpacking plan, and a month later the plan was dead. In August, Roosevelt nominated and the Senate confirmed a successor to Van Devanter-Senator Hugo L. Black, the New Deal's most effective legislative
champion. It was Roosevelt's first-and, as it turned out, his most
significant-Supreme Court appointment. With Black's accession,
the Court's change of direction was confirmed.
Almost sixty years were to go by before the Court again ventured
to strike down a federal statute bottomed on one or another aspect of
Congress's plenary power over the economy.n With the demise of the
Court-packing plan, the Court's authority appeared to be substantially
restored. But some dents in the Court's armor remained. Most damaging had been the sudden, and largely unexplained, shifts of position by Roberts-and, but to a lesser extent, Hughes-between 1936
and 1937. It took a long time for the Court fully to recover from what
was described, with splendid malice, as "The Switch In Time That
Saved Nine." Roberts's own reputation suffered so substantially that
in 1945, some months after he left the Court, Roberts acceded to
Frankfurter's request that Roberts prepare a memorandum demonstrating that his change in position from Tipaldo to Parrishwas not
simply a tactical retreat in the face of FDR's Court-packing plan.
Roberts's memorandum undertook to establish two facts. The first
fact was that Roberts's votes in Tipaldo and Parrishwere not inconsistent, since counsel supporting the validity of the Parrish statute had
presented an argument, which Roberts found decisive, not presented
by counsel in Tipaldo.24 The second fact was that Roberts cast his Parrish vote, in conference, before, not after, the President unveiled the
"- In Steward, the unemployment compensation case, dissenting opinions were
filed by McReynolds, Sutherland (joined by Van Devanter) and Butler. In Helvering v.
Davis, the old-age benefits case, only McReynolds and Butler dissented.
23 One qualification of this sweeping statement is in order.
In 1976 the Court, in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), held that Congress's 1974 decision to extend coverage of the federal wages and hours legislation to state and municipal employees invaded the sovereignty of the states. This anomalous decision was
overruled nine years later. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985).
24 Counsel for the state in Tipaldo had sought to distinguish,
but had not asked the
Court to overrule, the Court's 1923 decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S.
525 (1923), a decision Roberts thought could not be distinguished, and hence found
controlling; by contrast, counsel for the state in Parrishhad argued that Adkins should
be overruled-a course of action that Roberts, joining Hughes, Brandeis, Stone and
Cardozo, was prepared to pursue.
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Court-packing plan.25 Frankfurter disclosed the Roberts memorandum in the article he contributed to the memorial issue of the University ofPennsylvaniaLaw Review, published in December of 1955, following Roberts's death in May. One can sense how grievously Roberts's
later years on the Court must have been shadowed by the "Switch In
Time" calumny when one thinks about the loss of dignity the Justice
must have felt as he drafted that exculpatory memorandum.
IV.
The Court's opinion in Jones & Laughlin, taken together with several Commerce Clause opinions in the next half-dozen years, seemed
to insure that Congress could deploy its power over interstate commerce without fear of judicial impediment. The cases appeared to
hold that, provided a rational basis for Congress's action could be judicially discerned, a statute governing goods distributed in the national marketplace, or governing transactions involving such goods,
would be sustained as a valid exercise of the commerce power.

25 The Roberts memorandum is set forth in Frankfurter,
supra note 7, at 314-15.
Frankfurter concluded his tribute to his friend with the following words:
Owen J. Roberts contributed his good and honest share to that coral-reef
fabric which is law. He was content to let history ascertain, if it would, what
his share was. But only one who had the good fortune to work for years beside him, day by day, is enabled to say that no man ever served on the Supreme Court with more scrupulous regard for its moral demands than Mr.
Justice Roberts.
Id. at 317.
In 1994, Michael Ariens published in the HarvardLaw Review an article advancing
the astonishing notion-not, to be sure, as a certainty, but as a distinct possibilitythat the Roberts memorandum was not genuine but was actually a Frankfurter con-

struct. See Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat 107 HARV. L. REv. 620
(1994). In the pages of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Professor Friedman

has recently demolished Professor Ariens's curious hypothesis. See Richard D. Friedman, A Reaffirmation: The Authenticity of the Roberts Memorandum or Felix the Non-Forger,

142 U. PA. L. REV. 1985 (1994). Particular note should be taken of Professor Friedman's footnote six, id. at 1986, in which there is excerpted a 1994 exchange of letters
between Bennett Boskey and Dean Griswold in which those two immensely knowledgeable observers of the Court-who were intimates of many of the Justices
(Frankfurter among them) for well over half-a-century-agreed that the Ariens innuendo was the height of absurdity.
It also should be pointed out that Dean Griswold, in his essay in the December
1955 issue of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, was able to reconstruct the Ti-

paldo-Parrishscenario without the benefit of access to the Roberts memorandum. See
Griswold, supra note 7, at 340-44. (See the asterisked editorial note, id. at 340, in
which the editors of Volume 104 attest to the fact that Griswold "did not have available
to him" the Roberts memorandum adduced by Frankfurter.)
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So matters stood for almost six decades. 2c But in April of last year,
in United States v. Lopez," the Court invalidated a federal statute making it a crime to possess a gun within one thousand feet of a school.
The awkwardly drafted statute did not contain an ingredient of interstate transportation-an ingredient conventional, but by no means
uniformly present, in regulatory statutes of this kind-under which
the government would have to prove that on some occasion before it
was taken to school the prohibited gun traveled across state lines.
The absence of such an ingredient, together with congressional silence as to the statute's constitutional rationale, led the majorityChiefJustice Rehnquist, who wrote the principal opinion, and Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas-to conclude that the statute outstripped the commerce power. The principal dissenting opinion was written by Justice Breyer, and was joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter and Ginsburg. Justice Breyer's dissent persuasively established
that, whether or not Congress had bothered to articulate a rationale
for the statute, Congress could have reasonably felt that the United
States has a strong economic need to rid schools of guns: guns in
schools undermine the educational process, and children who do not
learn will not be productive members of a society whose place in the
competitive world market is increasingly at risk.
Justice Souter, in a separate dissent, gave historical perspective to
his misgivings: "[It seems fair to ask whether the step taken by the
Court today does anything but portend a return to the untenable jurisprudence from which the Court' extricated itself almost 60 years
ago. The answer is not reassuring. 1
Since the Lopez decision last year, the Court has had no further
occasion to opine on the scope of Congress's commerce power. But
this year the Court took a significant step to limit Congress's remedial
authority to implement that power. In Seminole Tribe v. FloridaY the
Court held invalid a provision of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,
enacted in 1988. In that statute Congress, in the exercise of its
authority under the Constitution to "regulate commerce... with the
Indian Tribes" (a constitutional twin to Congress's authority to regulate interstate commerce), formulated procedures under which a

26

But see supra note 23.

115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
I have discussed Lopez in Foreword,94 MIcH. L. REV. 533 (1995), and in Perspectives
on a Divided Court, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 285 (1996).
28 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1654
(SouterJ., dissenting).
116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
27
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tribe wishing to launch a gaming facility-i.e., a casino or similar establishment-can undertake to negotiate what is called a "Tribal-State
compact" with the state in which the facility is to be located. The
statute provides that a tribe which feels that a state is not negotiating
in good faith may ask a federal court for an order directing the state
to carry out its duty to negotiate. Statutory provisions authorizing private litigants to sue states for years have been a familiar part of federal
legislation enacted to enforce the liberty, equality and due process
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. But the Court in Seminole
Tribe held that under the Indian Commerce Clause-which the Court
construed to be congruent with the Interstate Commerce Clause in
this respect-Congress lacks power to authorize private suits against a
state. To permit such suits would, according to the Court, undermine
the sovereign immunity of the several states.
Because of the time constraints imposed by the lecture format you
are spared an exegesis of the three Seminole Tribe opinions-one for
the Court and two dissents-which will take up one-hundred and fifty
pages in the U.S. Reports. But, without engaging in such an exegesis, I
would note two things. First, given that to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment Congress can authorize private suits against states, it is
hard to understand what important principle of federalism would be
sacrificed if states were to be defendants in private suits arising under
the Commerce Clause. Second, it should not pass unobserved that
the Court's division in Seminole Tribe replicated its division in Lopez.
The Chief Justice wrote for the Court in Seminole Tribe, as he did in
Lopez, and was joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and
Thomas. Dissenting in Seminole Tribe were Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg and Breyer. The dissenting opinions were by Justices Stevens and Souter. Justice Souter's demonstration-all ninety-one
pages of it-that "neither text, precedent, nor history supports the
majority's abdication of our responsibility to exercise the jurisdiction
entrusted to us in Article III, " " may properly be characterized, in today's jurisprudentially correct terminology, as awesome.
Thus, as we are about to celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of the
"Switch In Time," we find that the Court, this year and last, has in
Seminole Tribe limited Congress's remedial capacity to regulate commerce, and may, pursuant to Lopez, be bent on actually narrowing the
scope of such regulation.

30

Id. at 1185 (SouterJ., dissenting).
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V.
In discussing Lopez and Seminole Tribe I have sought to raise the
question whether the current five-Justice majority is risking repetition
of the errors made by the Court, in which Roberts played a leading
role, in the Commerce Clause cases of 1935 and 1936. I will now discuss another problem area-one that I regard as of greater consequence-in which Roberts erred and the current majority is courting
serious trouble.
A. FromNixon v. Herndon to Smith v. Allwright
I want to tell a story that reached a climax in 1936 and a second
climax in 1944. But the story begins in 1924. In that year Dr. A.L.
Nixon, an El Paso physician, appeared at a polling place to vote in the
Democratic primary. The election officials declined to let him vote,
for the reason that a Texas statute provided that "in no event shall a
negro be eligible to participate in a Democratic party primary election
held in the State of Texas." 3' Relying on the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, Dr. Nixon sued the election officials for damages in a Texas federal district court. The district court dismissed the
complaint. Speaking through Holmes, the unanimous Supreme
Court reversed. In a three-paragraph opinion entitled Nixon v. Hemdon,32 Holmes held that the Texas statute contravened
the Equal Pro33
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the 1928 Democratic primary Dr. Nixon was again turned away
from the polls. This time the rule excluding blacks had been formulated by the Texas Democratic Party's Executive Committee, but the
Committee acted on the basis of a new Texas statute, enacted after
the decision in Nixon v. Hemndon, that conferred on each political
party's state executive committee the authority to decide on party
membership and participation. Again Dr. Nixon sued. Again Dr.
Nixon's suit was dismissed, and the dismissal was affirmed by the
court of appeals. Again the Supreme Court reversed. This time-in
Nixon v. Condon,34 decided in 1932-the Court spoke through Hol31 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540
(1927).

273 U.S. 536 (1927).
33 "States may do a good deal of classifying that it is difficult to believe rational,
but
there are limits, and it is too clear for extended argument that color cannot be made
the basis of a statutory classification affecting the right set up in this case." Id. at 541.
54 286 U.S. 73 (1932). Nixon v. Condon was first argued
on January 7, 1932. On
January 12, Holmes retired. See 284 U.S. III (1932). On February 15, Cardozo was
32
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mes's successor, Cardozo: "Delegates of the State's power have discharged their official functions in such a way as to discriminate invidiously between white citizens and black. ''0 5 Speaking through
McReynolds, the Four Horsemen dissented.
Three weeks after Nixon v. Condon -was decided, the Texas Democratic Party adopted a resolution limiting party membership and participation to "white citizens." " A third round of litigation ensued, but
this time Dr. Nixon was no longer the plaintiff. And this time, in
1935, in Grovey v. Townsend,37 the Court rejected the constitutional
claim. The new exclusion was found to be constitutionally unobjectionable because Texas had neither made the rule itself nor selected
the entity authorized to fashion the rule. The Court treated the rule
as a species of private ordering to which the strictures of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, addressed to state action, did not
attach. The author of the opinion 'was Roberts.
The opinion in Grovey v. Townsend was announced on April 1,
1935. It was unanimous: Since even the liberal Justices joined Roberts's opinion for the Court, one had to look beyond the pages of the
U.S. Reports for a dissenting opinion. But a dissenting opinion was not
long in coming. The May 1 issue of The Nation contained an editorial
entitled "BlackJustice." The editorial minced no words:
The opinion ofJustice Roberts is singularly unconvincing. It lies in a
rarefied atmosphere of dialectic far removed from political actuality. It
seems irrelevant to the court.., that the primary has usurped the place
of the election, and that exclusion from the primary robs the Negro of
his suffrage. The court's argument is that the prohibitions of the Constitution are upon the state, and a political party is a voluntary association. In short, Justice Roberts detaches the primary from the election,
makes the party in charge an exclusive club-and, off to such an ipse
dixitical start, the conclusion comes easy.
It is hard to magnify the tragedy of the decision.'s
nominated to succeed Holmes, and, on February 24, the Senate confirmed the nomination; Cardozo was sworn in and was seated on March 14. See 285 U.S. III (1932).
Nixon v. Condon was reargued on March 15 and decided on May 2. There cannot have
been many instances in the Court's history in which a Justice has been assigned the
opinion-writing responsibility in a case of substantial importance and evident difficulty
(fourJustices dissented) argued on the Justice's second day on the bench.
s3Condon, 286 U.S. at 89.
s6Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 47 (1935).
37 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
BlackJustic4 140 NATION 497, 497 (1935).
Professor Friedman notes in his article, supra note 7, at 1914 n.106, that some critics of Grovey v. Townsend-including The Nation, in the editorial excerpted in the text-
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In 1941, six years after Grovey v. Townsend, in United States v. Classic,3 a federal criminal prosecution for altering and miscounting ballots cast in a 1940 Louisiana primary to select a Democratic congressional candidate, the Court recognized that subverting such a primary
is, "as a matter of law and in fact, an interference with the effective
choice of the voters at the only stage of the election procedure when
their choice is of significance."'o In 1944, the Court, in Smith v. Allwright,41 reexamined Grovey v. Townsend. Of the members of the
Grovey v. Townsend Court, only Stone and Roberts remained. In Smith
v. Allwright two lawyers named William Hastie and Thurgood Marshall
persuaded the Court that Grovey v. Townsend, reconsidered in the light
of Classic,had to be overruled.42
Roberts was the lone dissenter. His unhappiness with what he
perceived as a pattern of casual disregard for precedent, of which
Smith was only the most recent instance, was the catalyst for a sentence
which may be Roberts's most celebrated verbal legacy: "The reason
for my concern is that the instant decision, overruling that andeemed Grovey v. Townsend far more of a defeat for civil rights than they deemed the
Court's decisions in the second round of the Scottsboro cases a victory. Scottsboro 11, decided on the same day as Grovey v. Townsend, consisted of Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S.
587 (1935) and Pattersonv. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600 (1935). Norris and Pattersonwere sequels to Powell v. Alabama (Scottsboro 1), 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In Powel the Court had set
aside the rape convictions and death sentences of seven of the (originally nine)
"Scottsboro Boys"; the state's failure to ensure that the youthful black defendants received adequate representation by competent counsel was held to contravene due
process. Subsequent to the decision in Powell two of the Scottsboro defendantsClarence Norris and Haywood Patterson-were again tried, convicted and sentenced
to death, and once again the convictions were upheld by Alabama's highest court. In
Norris, the Court, speaking through ChiefJustice Hughes, found systematic exclusion
of blacks from the jury rolls from which were drawn the grand jury that had indicted
all the defendants and the petitjury that had tried Norris; accordingly, Norris's conviction was reversed. Pattersonpresented identical issues ofjury discrimination, but Patterson's conviction was vacated rather than reversed, and the case remanded to the
Alabama Supreme Court, so that the latter court could determine whether its affirmance of Patterson's conviction rested on a state ground that involved no federal
question and hence was not subject to review by the United States Supreme Court.
Viewing the matter in the hindsight of over sixty years, I do not agree that Grovey v.
Townsend was wronger than Scottsboro I was right, but I do not find it surprising that
some Court-watchers so concluded in 1935.
39 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
40 M at 314.
41 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
42 Said the Court:
This grant to the people of the opportunity for choice is not to be nullified by
a State through casting its electoral process in a form which permits a private
organization to practice racial discrimination in the election. Constitutional
rights would be of little value if they could be thus indirectly denied.
Id. at 664.
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nounced about nine years ago, tends to bring adjudications of this
tribunal into the same 4 class
as a restricted railroad ticket, good for
3
this day and train only.
B. FromSmith v. Alhwright to Shaw v. Reno and Beyond
Smith v. Allwright opened up the possibility that blacks could vote
in the South. But that possibility was not to be realized in any comprehensive fashion for another quarter century. The land mines of
the poll tax, of corruptly administered literacy tests, and of outright
intimidation blocked the path. But then came Martin Luther King;
and the several civil rights initiatives ultimately coalescing in the
Southern Regional Council's Voter Education Project; and the Selmato-Montgomery march; and Lyndon Johnson and the Voting Rights
Act of 1965. Blacks began to register to vote in significant numbers.
But throughout the South-and, indeed, in the North as wellrelatively few blacks have achieved major elective office. A principal
reason for this is that white voters, in general, do not vote for black
candidates, so black voting strength has not been matched by black
representation in state legislatures or in Congress. Against that background, the Justice Department, in administering the Voting Rights
Act in areas in which blacks have historically voted in small numbers,
has pushed the state legislatures, when engaged in periodic redrawing
of state legislative and congressional district lines, to create a few districts in which blacks constitute a voting majority sufficient to provide
a realistic opportunity for the election of black candidates.
These Justice Department efforts have spawned a series of cases in
which the Court has addressed the question of whether it is unconstitutional to draw legislative district lines with the advertent purpose of
creating what are called "majority-minority" districts. The first case4
posing the issue- UnitedJewish Organizationsof Williamsburgh v. Cary
(a case name whose polysyllabic magnificence I will collapse into
43 Id. at 669. Although I am critical of Grovey v. Townsend, and regret
that Roberts
was unable, when Smith v. Allwright came to the Court, to recognize that the time had

come to jettison the earlier ruling, I do not mean to suggest that Roberts was as a general matter unsympathetic to civil liberties claims. Roberts wrote for the Court, sustaining such claims, in Herndon v. Lowy, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (freedom of speech),
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (public assembly) and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940) (freedom of religion). On the other hand, Roberts also wrote for the
Court in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), the retrograde right-to-counsel case which

diluted due process of law for over twenty years until overturned by Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
430 U.S. 144 (1977).
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UJO)-involved the redrawing of state legislative districts in Brooklyn
in the mid-seventies. The Court found no constitutional impediment.
The Court acknowledged "that New York deliberately increased the
nonwhite majorities in certain districts in order to enhance the opportunity for election of nonwhite representatives from those districts." 45 But the Court went on to find that
the plan did not minimize or unfairly cancel out white voting strength
.... [T]he plan left white majorities in approximately 70% of the assembly and senate districts in Kings County [Brooklyn], which had a
countywide population that was 65% white. Thus, even if voting in the
county occurred strictly according to race, whites would not be under46
represented relative to their share of the population.

But in this decade, the Court has taken a very different view.
Starting in 1993, in Shaw v. Renoj and continuing through a series of
4
48
cases decided last year and this year,49 the Court has held that for
race to be the dominant factor of the numerous factors employed in
drawing district lines is unconstitutional unless the state can demonstrate a "compelling interest" in achieving the desired results-a
demonstration that none of the states in the cases the Court has ruled
on has been able to make to the Court's satisfaction. UJO-the
Brooklyn case-has not been expressly overruled, but it has been distinguished into oblivion.
In the cases, starting with Shaw v. Reno, that have departed from
UJO, the Court has divided five-to-four. The division replicates the
five-to-four division in Lopez and Seminole Tribe50 In my respectful
45Id. at 165.

Id. at 165-66. The sentences quoted in the text are from Part IV of Justice
White's opinion-a part of the opinion that was joined by Justices Rehnquist and Stevens. Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion in which Justice Powell joined, made
much the same point. See id. at 179-80 (Stewart, J., concurring). Part III of Justice
White's opinion reached the same result via an alternate pathway-namely, that New
York merely "accede[d] to a position taken by the Attorney General that was authorized by our constitutionally permissible construction of § 5 [of the Voting Rights Act]."
Id. at 164. Part III was joined by Justice Stevens and, in a concurring opinion, byJustice Brennan, with whom Justice Blackmun agreed. Justices Stewart and Powell found
it unnecessary to examine "whether the position of the Department ofJustice in this
case was required or even authorized by the Voting Rights Act." Id. at 180 n.*. Chief
Justice Burger dissented. Justice Marshall did not participate in the decision.
47 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
48 SeeMiller v.Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); cf United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct.
2431 (1995).
49 SeeBush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996); Shawv. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
M In Shaw v. Reno the dissenters were Justices White, Blackmun,
Stevens and
Souter. By the time the subsequent cases that I have referred to reached the Court,
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view, the dissenters have the better part of the argument. I recognize,
of course, that there may be prudential arguments against drawing
district lines with an eye to their racial composition. Concentrating
minority voters in one legislative district may yield the election of a
minority member of Congress or the state legislature but at the expense of any significant minority political clout in adjacent legislative
districts whose representatives may feel free to ignore the interests of
their minority constituents. Recognizing this risk, I am inclined, as a
prudential matter, to see it as more important, at least in the short
run, to provide some assurance of the electability, at least to Congress,
of some blacks or Hispanics in states where, prior to the challenged
redistrictings, few or none had been elected to Congress or the state
legislatures since the turn of the century or earlier-as was true, for
example, in North Carolina and Georgia, whose congressional redistrictings the Court vetoed. But my argument is not a point of policy,
it is a point of law: The text and history of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments do not mandate the result arrived at in Shaw v.
Reno and the later cases. To construe the Constitution as the five Justices have done is to narrow political options in such a way as to bar
potentially fruitful experiments, and to do so in a way that is out of
harmony with practices of long standing. Justice Ginsburg's dissent in
the Georgia case, Millerv.Johnson,5' makes this clear:
Until now, no constitutional infirmity has been seen in districting Irish
or Italian voters together, for example, so long as the delineation does
not abandon familiar apportionment practices. If Chinese-Americans
and Russian-Americans may seek and secure group recognition in the
delineation of voting districts, then African-Americans should not be dissimilarly treated. Otherwise, in the name of equal protection, we would
shut out "the very minority group whose 52history in the United States
gave birth to the Equal Protection Clause."

In arguing that the Court was closer to the mark in UJO than it is
today I am, however, operating under some constraint. The constraint arises from the fact that once upon a time I was a law teacher
and would, occasionally, wander into court, pretending I was a real
lawyer. Back in 1976, when UJO came to the Court, it was my privilege
to be, along with others, counsel to the NAACP, an intervenor supporting the contention of New York's Governor Carey that the BrookJustices White and Blackmun had retired and had been succeeded by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer; the newJustices took their predecessors' places in dissent.
' 115 S.Ct. 2475 (1995).
52 Id. at 2506 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting
Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. at 679 (StevensJ, dissenting)).
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lyn redistricting plan was constitutional. Since, in my quasi-lawyer capacity, I argued that proposition to the Court twenty years ago, you
may reasonably doubt that I am objective today. So I will refrain from
burdening you with my 1976 rhetoric-compelling as it was. I will
content myself with presenting two snippets of argument in UJO in
which I played no part.
First, a colloquy between the Court and the extraordinarily able
lawyer who represented the plaintiff United Jewish Organizations of
Williamsburgh, Nathan Lewin:
THE COURT: Well, suppose the legislature districts expressly and explicitly for the purpose of maximizing the number of Republican districts or the maximum number of Democratic districts, in order to, as
they say, approach by districting as near as possible proportional representation?
MR. LEWIN: That, this court has sustained it in Gaffney [Gaffney v.
Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973)], and we certainly don't challenge it.
THE COURT: But expressly they draw the lines on aMR LEWIN: Expressly, yes. We think politics is part of the political
process. Race is not part of the political process. Race is an impermissible standard, except when it is being used-it can be struck down when
it's being used to reduce the voting effectiveness of voters. s

Second, an excerpt from the responsive argument of the equally
able lawyer who in UJO argued for the United States in support of the
Brooklyn redistricting-the Solicitor General, Robert Bork:
And I was astounded when Mr. Lewin said that race is not a part of
our political process. Race has been the political issue in this nation
since it was founded. And we may regret that that is a political reality,
but it is a reality. That's what the Fifteenth Amendment is about, what
the Civil War was about. It's what the Constitution was in part about,
and it is a subject we struggle with politically today.54

VI.
In my remarks today I have spoken critically of some of the workproduct of Justice Roberts. And I have also spoken critically of some

33

92

5

Record at 62, UJO (No. 75-104) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law

LANDMtARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 829 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1978).

Review).
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of the collective work-product of five current Justices who, on important constitutional issues, vote together with marked frequency."
What is it that connects my criticism of Roberts and my criticism of
the current five-Justice majority? The connection is this: Sixty years
ago Roberts and the Four Horsemen-and, in Grotvey v. Townsend, the
entire Court-looked at an America that was not a real America, but a
Potemkin America whose ills could be cured by a Potemkin constitution. And my concern is that in similar fashion today's five-Justice majority has, in the decisions I have discussed, engaged in scrutinystrict or otherwise-of the issues before them through a flawed constitutional prism, one that has blurred many of the harsh outlines of our
beloved and beleaguered country.
My concern about Lopez and Seminole Tribe is in fact quite limited.
I expect Lopez to turn out to be an isolated phenomenon-essentially
an allergic reaction to a badly drawn and unnecessary statute
(unnecessary because state laws, state prosecutors and state courts are
fully competent to handle the problem of guns in schools). And I
expect Seminole Tribe to turn out to be more molehill than mountain-a modest procedural obstacle that Congress can with a little
imagination effectively circumvent.' The redistricting decisions seem
to me far more troublesome. With respect, and with regret, I submit
that these decisions-together with kindred pronouncements of the
same five-Justice majority in the realm of affirmative action 7 -appear
to take as their predicate a vision of American racial problems which
is two-dimensional. To say, as the Court said in Shaw v. Reno, that a
reapportionment plan in which race is a defining ingredient "bears
an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid, ''es is to suggest
5 See Pollak, Perspectives on a Divided Court, supra note 27, at 305. There
are, of

course, significant exceptions. For example,Justice Kennedy (who wrote the opinion)
and Justice O'Connor joined Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer in invalidating the Colorado constitutional provision prohibiting governmental action protecting homosexuals from discrimination. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
AndJustice Kennedyjoined justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer in invalidating the Arkansas constitutional provision setting term limits for Arkansas's United
States senators and representatives. See United States Term Limits v. Thornton, 115 S.
Ct. 1842 (1995).
Where the issues involved in implementing the commerce power are of a sort
perceived by Congress to be of real importance, Congress can presumably authorize
federal agencies to initiate federal court litigation, on behalf of the United States as
plaintiff, against a state. Nothing in Seminole Tribe impairs the authority of the United
States to sue a state in a federal court.
5 SeeAdarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2098 (1995); cf
Missouri v.Jenkins,
115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
58 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
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that the use of race as an instrument to combat racial discrimination
is fungible with the use of race to degrade. In this year which is the
centennial of Plessy v. Ferguson,50 the doomsday decision in which the
Court equated "separate but equal" with "the equal protection of the
laws," we must be particularly wary of slogans that masquerade as constitutional
principle, lest we tie our hands in ways that could be ca60
lamitous.

163 U.S. 537 (1896).
CIThe ramifying and deleterious impact of the Court's current affirmative action
YJ

jurisprudence is illustrated by the opinion handed down last year by a panel of the
Fifth Circuit invalidating the admissions system of the University of Texas Law School.
See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). The opinion did not limit itself to
addressing the (manifest) flaws in that particular program; the opinion took a far
broader view, announcing, inter alia, that the opinion ofJustice Powell in Regents of the
Univ. of Calif.v. Bakke 438 U.S. 265 (1978), should now be ignored:
We agree with the plaintiffs that any consideration of race or ethnicity by
the law school for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body is not a
compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Powell's argument in Bakke garnered only his own vote and has never represented the
view of a majority of the Court in Bakke or any other case. Moreover, subsequent Supreme Court decisions regarding education state that non-remedial
state interests will never justify racial classifications. Finally, the classification
of persons on the basis of race for the purpose of diversity frustrates, rather
than facilitates, the goals of equal protection.
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.
One member of the Hopwood panel concurred in the judgment but did not join
the broad-ranging opinion.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Texas v. Hopwood, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
Justice Ginsburg,joined by Justice Souter, filed a brief opinion with respect to the denial of certiorari:
Whether it is constitutional for a public college or graduate school to use
race or national origin as a factor in its admissions process is an issue of great
national importance. The petition before us, however, does not challenge the
lower courts' judgments that the particular admissions procedure used by the
University of Texas Law School in 1992 was unconstitutional. Acknowledging
that the 1992 admissions program "has long since been discontinued and will
not be reinstated," the petitioners do not defend that program in this Court.
Instead, petitioners challenge the rationalerelied on by the Court of Appeals.
"[T]his Court," however, "reviews judgments, not opinions." Accordingly, we
must await a final judgment on a program genuinely in controversy before
addressing the important question raised in this petition.
Id. at 2581-82 (citations omitted).
A recent article in the New York Times reports (1) a substantial drop in black and
Hispanic applications to the University of Texas since Hopwood was decided and (2) a
cognate, albeit less precipitous, drop in black, Hispanic and Native American applications to California's state university system since the Board of Regents decreed an end
to affirmative-action admissions programs. See Peter Applebomne, UniversitiesReport Less
Minority Interest AfterAction to Ban Preferences, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1997, at B12.
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For almost sixty years Owen Roberts has been pilloried for the
"Switch In Time." I think that one who criticizes him-as I do-for
the decisions leading up to the "Switch" ought to acknowledge that
the Justice deserves praise for having had the gumption to change his
mind. Roberts was an honest man. He wvas honest with himself: "'I
have no illusions about my judicial career. But one can only do what
one can. Who am I to revile the good God that he did not make me a
Marshall, a Taney, a Bradley, a Holmes, a Brandeis or a Cardozo."' 6'
Roberts fell short of distinction as a member of the Court that has
principal custody of the Constitution because he had too limited a
perception of the Court's constitutional role. In the Butlercase, in the
opinion striking down the first Agricultural Adjustment Act, Roberts
wrote that when a statute is challenged as unconstitutional, "the judicial branch ... has only one duty,-to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to
decide whether the latter squares with the former."" But Roberts's
honesty led him, on occasion, to see more clearly-and hence to
judge better-than colleagues of greater sophistication. In Korematsu
v. United States, 3 in 1944, the Court upheld the wartime detention of
American citizens of Japanese ancestry. The six-Justice majority was
led by Black and Frankfurter, the two Justices-so often in disagreement with each other-conventionally (and properly) regarded as the
best and the brightest of that era. In that most significant judicial
failure since Plessy, the Korematsu majority managed to avoid fulfilling
their duty to assure that liberty and equality and due process of law
are paramount values in war as well as in peace. Roberts was one of
the three Justices who dissented.6
Roberts was right in Korematsu because he had both the gumption
and the clarity of vision to look at the actual problem before the
Court in three dimensions. Had he seen as clearly earlier in his career he would have fared better. In Butler he would not have written-or at least would not have preserved after the first draft-his description of the process of judicial review. I would like to think he
Frankfurter, supra note 7, at 312 (quoting Roberts, unattributed quotation).
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
63 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
64 The other dissenters were Justices Murphy and Jackson. The
pioneering, contemporaneous, comprehensive, devastating-and superb-critique of Korematsu and
61

62

related cases is Eugene V. Rostow, TheJapaneseAmerican Cases-A Disaster,54 YALE LJ.

489 (1945).
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would have gone back and read what Holmes had written about judicial review a number of years earlier, and Holmes's words might even
have led Roberts to a different result. In any event it would be a good
thing if Holmes's words were thought about by today's Justices-not
just the five whose decisions I have criticized, but all of the nine:
[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like
the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have
called into life a being the development of which could not have been
foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough
for them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has
taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to
prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be considered
in the light of our whole experience ....
I have come to the end of my cautionary tale.

1ZMissouri v. Holland,

252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).

